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COMMENT
THE AFTERMATH OF UNITED STATES v. CARLTON:
TAXPAYERS WILL HAVE TO PAY
FOR CONGRESS'S MISTAKES
I. INTRODUCTION

In a recent case, United States v. Carlton,1 the Supreme Court
changed course, without saying it was doing so, by upholding retroactive
legislation in an area where it previously had not. The Court upheld a
retroactive amendment to the Tax Reform Act (TRA) of 1986 against a
due process challenge. 2 The retroactive amendment removed an estate tax
deduction which, under pre-amendment law, was available to estates that
made "qualified sale[s]" to employee stock-ownership plans (ESOPs).'
The TRA of 19864 became law on October 22, 1986.1 Section 1172
of the TRA of 1986, which was codified as § 2057 of Title 26 of the
United States Code, 6 and allowed an estate tax deduction for half the
proceeds of "any sale of employer securities by the executor of an
estate" 7 to an ESOP. s In December 1986, Carlton, an executor, relying
on § 2057 of the Code, purchased "employer securities," 9 sold them to
1. 114 S. Ct. 2018 (1994) (unanimous opinion, Justices O'Connor and Scalia, JJ.,
separately concurring).
2. Id. at 2024.
3. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, tit. X,
§ 10411, 101 Stat. 1330, 1330-432 amendingThe Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-514, § 1172, 100 Stat. 2085, 2513-15 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 2057 (1988)); see
also Carlton, 114 S. Ct. at 2020 (discussing the amendment). 26 U.S.C. § 2057 was
subsequently repealed in 1989. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub.
L. No. 101-239, tit. VII, § 7304(a)(1), 103 Stat. 2106, 2352. The fact that § 2057 has
been repealed has no bearing on the analysis in this comment; this comment deals only
with the Supreme Court's treatment of retroactive tax statutes, not the tax treatment of
employee stock-ownership plans.
4. See Carlton, 114 S. Ct. at 2020; The Tax Reform Act of 1986, § 1172 (codified
at 26 U.S.C. § 2057 (repealed 1989)).
5. See The Tax Reform Act of 1986, § 1172 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 2057
(repealed 1989)).
6. Id.
7. 26 U.S.C. § 2057(b) (repealed 1989).
8. See 26 U.S.C. § 2057 (repealed 1989); Carlton, 114 S.Ct. at 2020.
9. Carlton, 114 S. Ct. at 2021. Employer securities were, until the 1987
amendment, any securities that the employer/decedent or the decedent's executor bought
and sold to a qualified ESOP. The tax provision was designed to encourage an employer
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an ESOP at a loss of $631,000, and then claimed a deduction on the estate
tax return.1 o

In January 1987, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued Notice 8713. The notice stated that pending the adoption of clarifying legislation,
the IRS would only recognize deductions claimed under § 2057 where the
decedent had "directly owned" the securities before death."I
Following the IRS's lead, Congress amended § 2057 in December

1987,12 one year after the pertinent facts in Carlton had occurred.' 3
The 1987 amendment provided that in order to qualify for the deduction,
the securities sold to an ESOP must have been owned directly by the

decedent "immediately before death." 4
The amendment applied
retroactively as if it had appeared in the original version of the TRA of
1986,15 and thus Carlton's deduction was denied.' 6 The estate was left
with a loss of $631,000.17
Carlton paid taxes on the proceeds of the ESOP transaction and
subsequently filed a refund claim with the IRS.'" The IRS denied his
refund claim, 9 and Carlton filed a refund action in the district court.20
to sell their company to his or her employees. See infra notes 273, 297 and
accompanying text.
10. Carlton, 114 S. Ct. at 2021.
11. See IRS Notice 87-13, 1987-1 C.B. 432, 442-43; see also Carlton v. United
States, 972 F.2d 1051, 1054 (9th Cir. 1992) (describing the IRS Notice), rev'd, 114 S.
Ct. 2018 (1994).
12. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10411,
101 Stat. 1330, 1330-432.
13. See id.; see also Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1054.
14. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 § 10411 (d); see Carlton, 972 F.2d
at 1054.
15. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 § 10411(b) ("The amendments
made by subsection (a) shall take effect as if included in the amendments made by section
1172 of the Tax Reform Act of 1986."); see Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1054.
16. Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1055.
17. See Carlton, 114 S. Ct. at 2021 (1994) (noting that Carlton lost $631,000 on the
sale of securities to the ESOP). The executor in Carlton sold MCI Communications
stock that he had purchased two days earlier to the MCI ESOP at a price lower than the
fair market value, realizing a $631,000 loss for the estate. Id. According to the
Supreme Court, this loss would have been of little consequence had the estate's deduction
not been denied: Carlton entered the ESOP transaction with the intent of obtaining a $5
million deduction even though the transaction would cost the estate $631,000. Id.
18. Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1055.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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The district court granted the government's summary judgment motion.21
The Ninth Circuit, however, reversed the district court's decision and
remanded the case with instructions to enter judgment in Carlton's
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding that
favor.23
the Circuit Court applied an "unduly strict standard"13 to the December
1987 retroactive amendment of § 2057, where the Circuit Court's decision

turned on (1) the fact that the executor had neither constructive nor actual
notice that the 1986 version of § 2057 would be retroactively amended and
(2) the fact that the executor detrimentally relied on the plain meaning of
the 1986 version of § 2057.24 The Supreme Court also held that the
1987 retroactive amendment was supported by a legitimate legislative
purpose furthered by rational means and thus satisfied the applicable due
process standard.'
In Carlton, the Supreme Court ignored hundreds of years of
consistent antipathy to ex post facto lawmaldng' when it applied the
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id.
Id. at 1062.
Carlton, 114 S. Ct. at 2024.
See id. at 2021, 2024.

25. Id.
26. See Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 147 (1938) (stating that two important
factors in a due process analysis of a retroactive taxing statute are whether a taxpayer
had notice that the original taxing statute would be retroactively amended and whether
the taxpayer's transaction had completely vested before such an amendmentwas enacted);
Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U.S. 440, 442-46 (1928) (striking down a statute that
retroactively imposed a tax on gifts made 88 days after the relevant bill was introduced
in Congress); Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U.S. 531, 542-43 (1927) (striking down a gift
tax statute which included in the decedent's gross estate property that had been
transferred by the decedent 12 years before passage of the Act); Blodgett v. Holden, 275
U.S. 142, 147 (1927) (invalidating a statute that retroactively imposed a tax on gifts
consummated before the statute was proposed to Congress); Licari v. Commissioner, 946
F.2d 690, 693 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that "federal courts have long been hostile to
legislation that interferes with settled expectations"); see also ST. THOMAS AQUINAS,
SUMMA THEOLOGICA 145 (R.J. Henle trans., Univ. of Notre Dame Press 1993) (1273)
(pointing out that in order for a law to be binding, the law must be promulgated to those
who are ruled by it); LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 38-39 (1964) (opining
that retroactive lawmaking, as well as other lawmaking that fails to provide the governed
with notice and the opportunity to plan according to the law, does not establish something
that properly may be called a legal system); JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON
CIVIL GOVERNMENT, § 136 (Prometheus Books 1986) (1690) (explaining that
"promulgated standing laws" are what distinguishes society from the state of nature);
Elmer E. Smead, The Rule Against Retroactive Legislation: A Basic Principle of
Jurisprudence,20 MINN. L. REV. 775 (1936) (discussing in detail the historical bias
against retroactive lawmaking).
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mere rationality test, which is the least exacting due process standard of
review, to the retroactive legislation.'
As a result of the Supreme
Court's holding in Carlton, the mere rationality test will be applied to
retroactive tax legislation as well as prospective economic legislation.28
This Comment explores United States Supreme Court decisions in the
area of retroactivity leading up to Carlton2 9 as well as Carlton's impact
on the tradition of hostility toward retroactive legislation.3" Section II
discusses, from a historical perspective, the hostility toward retroactive
lawmaking.3 ' Section III surveys the relevant Supreme Court cases
preceding Carlton. 2 Section IV examines Carlton at the Circuit Court
of Appeals and Supreme Court levels.33 Finally, Section V concludes
that the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals was correct and that the
Supreme Court, (in upholding the retroactive amendment) erroneously
deemphasized the factors of notice and detrimental reliance.'

27. Carlton, 114 S. Ct. at 2024. Under the rationality test, a law will be upheld if
it is rationally related to any conceivable legitimate end of government. The Court uses
this lowest due process standard of analysis-rationality review-in cases involving
prospective legislation. See, e.g., Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637 (1993); Duke Power
Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978) (applying rationality
standard to a statute limiting the aggregate liability of the atomic energy industry for a
single nuclear accident to $560,000); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963) (applying

rationality standard to prospective legislation that made it a misdemeanor to engage in
the business of debt adjustment except as incident to the lawful practice of law);

Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (applying rationality standard to uphold
prospective legislation, which, interalia, prevented opticians from fitting eyeglasses into
frames without a prescription from an opthamologist or optometrist).
28. See Carlton, 114 S. Ct. at 2018; Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 59; Ferguson,
372 U.S. at 726; Williamson, 348 U.S. at 483.
29. See infra notes 35-172 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 173-342 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 35-65 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 66-172 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 173-341 and accompanying text.

34. See infra text accompanying note 342.
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II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF RETROACTIVITY JURISPRUDENCE
Hostility toward retroactive laws dates back to ancient Greece.35 In
The Politics,36 Aristotle pointed out that changes in custom and
corresponding changes in unwritten law are inevitable and proper whereas
changes in written law require "great caution." 37 Aristotle asserted that
alterations in written law undermine the reliability of law and thus man's
obedience to it.3"
Similarly, in the thirteenth century,3 9 St. Thomas Aquinas wrote:
Hence, in order for a law to obtain the power of obligating which
is proper to a law, it must be applied to those who are to be
directed by it. This application takes place by being made known
to them by promulgation. Therefore, promulgation is necessary
for law to have its binding force.'
Here, Aquinas made the fundamental argument against retroactive
legislation: A person should not be bound by a law of which he or she
could not have notice.4 Thus, no written law should be promulgated
retrospectively.4'
Four centuries later, John Locke explained that "[t]he legislative, or
supreme authority, cannot assume to its self a power to rule by
extemporary arbitrary decrees, but is bound to dispensejustice, and decide
the rights of the subject by promulgated standing laws, and known
authorized judges . . . . ,' Locke further explained that the law of
nature, or unwritten law, is found only in the minds of men.4' Thus,
those who misapply it will not easily be convinced of their mistake absent
an established judge.4' But under the law of nature, each man is judge,
35. See Smead, supra note 26, at 775 (citing PAUL VINOGRADOFF, 2 OUTLINES OF
HISTORICAL JURISPRUDENCE 139-40 (1920)) (discussing the Greeks's hostility to ex post
facto laws). Vinogradoff provides an example of a Greek case in which a rule that
benefitted the affected parties was held invalid because the rule was retroactive. Id.
36. ARISTOTLE, THE PoLmcs (Sir Ernest Barker trans., 1947).

37. Id. at 88-89.

38. Id.

39.

AQUINAS,

supra note 26, at 145.

40. Id.

41. See id.
42. See id.
43. LOcKE, supra note 26, § 136, at 75-76.
44. Id. at 76.
45. Id.
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interpreter, and executioner of the law' and the individual, having only
single strength, does not have enough strength to defend himself or to
punish those who misapply the law. 47 Furthermore, Locke pointed out
that in order to avoid the inconveniences that disorder men's property in
the state of nature, men form societies to achieve security and defense of
their property through the united strength of the whole society, as well as
through binding "standing rules... by which every one may know what
is his. "41 To attain this stability, men invest all of their natural power
in the society into which they enter. 49 Locke wrote: "[T]he community
put[s] the legislative power into such hands as they think fit, with this
trust, that they shall be governed by declared laws, or else their peace,
quiet, and property will still be at the same uncertainty, as it was in the
state of nature." 5' Retroactive legislation does not come within Locke's
definition of "declared laws" because no legislature can declare a law
made now to have stood in the past.5 Thus, a legislature that enacts
retroactive laws creates the uncertainty and insecurity characteristic of the
state of nature. 52
Twentieth century legal scholar, Lon L. Fuller, also explained the
importance of notifying persons of the laws that bind them. 53 To
illustrate, Fuller described eight ways in which legislatures fail to make
law.5' Three ways are:
[1] fail[ing] ... to make available to the affected party, the rules
he is expected to observe; [2] . . . abus[ing] retroactive
legislation, which not only cannot itself guide action, but
undercuts the integrity of rules prospective in effect, since it puts
them under the threat of retrospective change ... [3] introducing
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.

49. Id.
50. Id. The drafting of the United States Constitution was heavily influenced by the
political writings of John Locke. Philosopher C.D. Broad wrote that Locke's principles

"were embalmed in the Constitution of the United States which survives like an ancient
family ghost haunting a modern sky-scraper." C.D. Broad, John Locke, 31 HIBBERT J.
249, 256 (1933).

51. See LocKE, supra note 26, at 76.
52. See id.
53. FULLER, supra note 26, at 38-39.
54. Id.
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such frequent changes in the rules that the subject cannot orient
his action by them. ... I

Fuller argued that failing in any one of these ways would result not only
in a bad system of law, but in something that properly could not be called
a legal system. 6 "Certainly there can be no rational ground for asserting

that a man can have a moral obligation to obey a legal rule that does not
exist, or is kept secret from him, or that came into existence only after he
had acted ... or [that] changed every minute."'
Echoing the words of these highly influential figures, the federal
courts have held that the requirement of notice is an integral factor in due
process analysis. 8 For instance, in Lambert v. California,59 the Court
stated: "Engrained in our concept of due process is the requirement of
notice."'
The United States Supreme Court has limited the application of the ex
post facto clauses, 6' Article I, §§ 9 and 10,62 to criminal statutes. 3
55. Id. at 39.
56. Id.
57. Id. In arguing that retroactive legislation could not properly be called law,
Fuller echoed arguments made at the federal constitutional convention. On the 22nd of
August, 1787 the following was said at the constitutional convention:
Mr. Ellsworth contended that there was no lawyer, no civilian, who
would not say, that ex post facto laws were void of themselves. It cannot,
then, be necessary to prohibit them.
Mr. Wilson was against inserting anything in the constitution, as to ex
postfacto laws. It will bring reflection on the constitution and proclaim that
we are ignorant of the first principles of legislation, or our constitutional
government that will be so.
SAUL K. PADOVER, To SECURE THESE BLESsINGs 223 (1970).

58. See supra note 26; see also Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957)
(holding that a Los Angeles felon registration ordinance violated due process when
applied to an individual who lacked actual knowledge of her duty to register). Justice
Douglas, writing for the majority, explained that if the Court were to uphold the
ordinance, "the evil would be as great as it is when the law is written in print too fine
to read or in a language foreign to the community." Id. at 230.
59. 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
60. Id. at 228.
61. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 ("No ... ex post facto Law shall be passed.");
Id. § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall ... pass any ... ex post facto Law.").
62. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 9, 10.
63. See Carlton v. United States, 972 F.2d 1051, 1055 n.3. (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd,
114 S. Ct. 2018 (1994). The court stated:

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

This narrow interpretation of the ban on ex post facto laws, however, has
not left those adversely effected by retroactive civil legislation without
grounds for challenging the constitutionality of such statutes.64 In
striking down as unconstitutional particular retroactive civil statutes, the
Supreme Court has looked to another section of the Constitution-the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment.'
III. HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'S
TREATMENT OF RETROACTIVE TAX STATUTES

In the late 1920s, Justice McReynolds' authored a string of opinions
in which the United States Supreme Court struck down retroactive gift tax

statutes.67

In Nichols v. Coolidge,6" a gift tax in the amount of

$34,662.65 was in dispute. 9 On July 29, 1907, Mrs. Coolidge and her
husband transferred certain real estate and personal property to trustees
who were to (1) hold the property and pay the income to the settlors, (2)
then pay the income to the surviving settlor, and (3) upon the surviving
settlor's death, distribute the corpus among the settlors' five children or
Under long-standing judicial construction, the Ex Post Facto Clause does not
apply here because this is not a criminal prosecution. "Although the Latin
phrase 'ex postfacto' literally encompasses any law passed 'after the fact,' it
has long been recognized by this Court that the constitutional prohibition on
ex post facto laws applied only to penal statutes which disadvantage the
offender affected by them." (Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 110 S. Ct.
2715, 2718, 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990) (citing Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.)
386, 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798)).

Id.
64. See, e.g., Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U.S. 440, 445 (1928); Blodgett v.
Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 147 (1927); Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U.S. 531, 542-43 (1927).
In each of these cases the Supreme Court invalidated a retroactive gift tax statute on due
process grounds.
65. See, e.g., Untermyer, 276 U.S. at 445; Blodgett, 275 U.S. at 147; Nichols, 274
U.S. at 542-43.
66. Associate Justice 1914-1941. A "staunch conservative... [who above] all,
- opposed the growing social and economic regulatory power of government and
believed that the Constitution fairly committed the nation to a policy of laissez-faire
capitalism . ...
" KERMIT L. HALL, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 542-43 (1992).
67. See Untermyer, 276 U.S. at 445; Blodgett, 275 U.S. at 147; Nichols, 274 U.S.
at 542-43.
68. 274 U.S. 531 (1927).
69. Id. at 533.
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their representatives.'
Under the deed, the interest of any child
predeceasing the surviving settlor would pass as provided by the statute
of
' 71
distribution "'in effect at the time of the death of such survivor. "
On April 6, 1917, the settlors assigned their entire interest in the
property to their children.' On May 18, 1917, Mrs. Coolidge and her
husband, by deeds purporting to convey fee simple title, gave their five
children two parcels of land.73 Simultaneously, the children leased these
parcels to Mr. and Mrs. Coolidge for one year at a nominal rent with a
provision for annual renewals until notice to the contrary.' Most of the
trustees' property passed out of their possession when Mrs. Coolidge, the
surviving settlor, died on January 6, 1921.15 In 1919, Congress amended
the federal estate tax law.76 The amendment was codified as the Revenue
Act of February 24, 1919.7 The government insisted that the transfers
in Nichols came within § 402(c) of the amendment,78 which taxed as part
of a decedent's gross estate, transfers "intended to take effect in
possession or enjoyment at or after [the decedent's] death79 (whether such
transfer or trust [was] made or created before or after the passage of th[e]
act)."'
In Nichols, the Court held that the retroactive gift tax statute in
question was so arbitrary and capricious that it amounted to confiscation
and thus offended the Fifth Amendment.8 ' The Court considered that the
transferor (1) had no constructive or actual notice that Congress would tax
as part of her estate transfers that would not take effect in possession until
after her death,' (2) that the transferor had acted in good faith, that is,
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

75. Id. at 532.

76. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 402, 40 Stat. 1057, 1097; see Nichols, 274 U.S.
at 533.
77. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 402(c); see Nichols, 274 U.S. at 534.
78. Nichols, 274 U.S. at 539-40.
79. Such transfers were to be taxed according to their value at the time of the
grantor's death. Revenue Act of 1918, § 402, 40 Stat. 1057, 1097-98; see Nichols, 274
U.S. at 534 n.*.
80. Revenue Act of 1918, § 402(c); see Nichols, 274 U.S. at 534-35 n.*.
81. See Nichols, 274 U.S. at 542-43.
82. See id. at 542.
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the gifts had not been made in contemplation of death to avoid estate
tax,81 and (3) that the grantees' interests had been vested, and thus were
beyond recall, for as many as twelve years before the 1919 statute was
enacted." Furthermore, the Court stated that Congress's legitimate
purpose for imposing the tax alone was insufficient to justify the
retroactive statute.8
During its next term, in Blodgett v. Holden,' the Court again
entertained the question of whether Congress had the power to tax gifts
made before the relevant tax measure had been proposed to the legislature.
In January 1924, Blodgett made inter vivos gifts of property valued at
over $850,000. 7 The relevant gift tax provision was presented in
Congress on February 25, 1924,88 and became law on June 2, 1924.89
The provision applied retroactively, as if it had been in effect since
January 1, 1924.' The court relied on Nichols and held that the June
2nd statute was arbitrary and invalid under the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment. 9 "It seems wholly unreasonable that one who, in
entire good faith and without the slightest premonition of such
consequence, made absolute disposition of his property by gifts should
thereafter be required to pay a charge for so doing."'
83. See id.(noting that "[t]he statute require[d] the executors to pay an excise

ostensibly laid upon transfer of property by death from Mrs. Coolidge to them but
reckoned upon its value plus the value of other property conveyed before the enactment
in entire good faith and without contemplation of death.").
84. Id. at 533, 538.

85. See id. at 540 (explaining that although Congress may properly attempt to
equalize taxation of testamentary dispositions, whether such dispositions were made by

will, intestacy, or were merely testamentary in effect, "[t]he mere desire to equalize
taxation cannot justify a burden on something not within congressional power"). The
Court also cited Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473, 494 (1925), to illustrate that
Congress attempted to do through the "back door," what it could not properly do through
the "front door," that is, Congress attempted to measure a tax upon dispositions of
property that Congress had no power to tax. See Nichols, 274 U.S. at 541.
86. 275 U.S. 142, 146 (1927); see also Carlton v. United States, 972 F.2d 1051,
1057 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S.Ct. 2018 (1994).
87. Blodgett, 275 U.S. at 146.
88. See id.at 146-47.
89. See id. at 145.
90. See id.(citing Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, §§ 319-24, 43 Stat. 253, 313-16).

91. Blodgett, 275 U.S. at 147; see also Carlton v. United States, 972 F.2d 1051,
1057 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S.Ct. 2018 (1994).
92. Blodgett, 275 U.S. at 147; see also Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1057.
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Later in the same term, in Untermyer v. Anderson,I the Court again
considered a taxpayer's constitutional challenge to the Revenue Act of
June 2, 1924.
Isaac Untermyer made gifts on May 23, 1924, 9' ten
days before the Act in question became effective and eighty-eight days
after the bill was introduced in Congress. 6 The Court held that Blodgett
and Untermyer were analogous and, to the extent they were
distinguishable, the differences were not material. 7 The Court stated
that the main difference was that Blodgett made his transfers before the
provisions were presented to Congress98 and Untermyer made his
transfers three months after the provisions were first presented and while
the conference report on the bill was pending. 9 The conference report
entered the Senate on May 22, 1924, and passed both houses on May 25,
1924.100
Congress applied the challenged gift tax provisions to gifts made
during the entire calendar year 1924,'0 but the Court held that "so far
as applicable to bona fide gifts not made in anticipation of death and fully
consummated prior to June 2, 1924, those provisions [were] arbitrary and
invalid under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment." '2 The
Court explained that the mere fact that the gifts were made while the
relevant provisions were in the final stage of progress through the
legislature was insufficient to distinguish Untennyer from Blodgett or to
neutralize the arbitrary nature of the statute. 1 3 Acceptance *of "the
contrary view" would have created barriers to both interpretation and
practical application of the statute and would have prevented understanding
of the burden imposed."°
As in Nichols and Blodgett, the Court
emphasized a taxpayer's interest in knowing when and how he becomes
93. 276 U.S. 440 (1928).

94. See id. at 444; see also Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1057.
95. Untermyer, 276 U.S. at 444; see also Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1057.
96. See Untermyer, 276 U.S. at 444 ("[U]ntermyer made his gift ... some three
months after [the retroactive tax] provisions were first presented and while the conference
report upon the bill was pending.").
97. See id. at 444-45; see also Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1057.

98. Untermyer, 276 U.S. at 444; see Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 146-47
(1927); see also Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1057.
99. Untermyer, 276 U.S. at 444.
100. See id. at 444-45.
101. See id. at 445.

102. Id.
103. See Untermyer, 276 U.S. at 445; see also Carlton v. United States, 972
F.2d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 2018 (1994).
104. See Untermyer, 276 U.S. at 445; see also Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1057.
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liable for taxes.' 5 Thus, where the taxpayer "cannot foresee and ought
10 6
not to be required to guess the outcome of the pending measures,"
7
Congress must notify the taxpayer of his obligations. ,0 The Court
additionally stated that because the "future of every bill while before
Congress is necessarily uncertain,"' 8 the taxpayer is not liable until
Congress definitively has expressed its will through final action.' °9
In 1930, in yet another opinion authored by Justice McReynolds,
Cooper v. United States," 0 the Court upheld the Revenue Act of 1921,
a retroactive income tax statute."' In Cooper, the petitioner's husband
purchased stock at $113.50 per share in 1918. "I He transferred that
stock to petitioner, his wife, on November 1, 1921,' 1 when the fair
market value of the stock was $210 per share." 4 The law in effect at
the time of the transfer set the basis in gift property (here, the shares) at
its fair market value. Six days later, on November 7, 1921, the petitioner
sold the stock at $210 per share." 5 The petitioner's return showed
$36,670 as gain derived from sale of the stock." 6 She paid income taxes
for the calendar year 1921,117 and later brought suit to recover
$8,474.90 plus interest, which she alleged had been exacted improperly." 8
105. See Untermyer, 276 U.S. at 445; see also Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1057.
106. Untermyer, 276 U.S. at 445-46; see also Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1057.

107. Untermyer, 276 U.S. at 44546; see also Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1057.
108. Untermyer, 276 U.S. at 446; see also Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1057.
109. See Untermyer, 276 U.S. at 446.
110. 280 U.S. 409 (1930).
111. Id. at 412; see also United States v. Carlton, 114 S. Ct. 2018, 2021-22

(1994).
112. Cooper, 280 U.S. at 410.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.

116. Id.
117. Id.

118. Id.
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In Cooper, the retroactive legislation in question was § 202(a)(2) of
the Revenue Act, November 23, 1921, effective January 1, 1921.11 9
Section 202(a) provided:
That the basis for ascertaining the gain derived or loss sustained
from a sale or other disposition of property, real, personal, or
mixed, acquired after February 28, 1913, shall be the cost of
such property; except that- . . . (2) [i]n the case of such
property, acquired by gift after December 31, 1920, the basis
shall be the same as that which it would have in the hands of the
donor or the last preceding owner by whom it was not acquired
by gift .... 120
Citing
Mrs. Cooper challenged this retroactive legislation application.'
Nichols, Blodgett, and Untermnyer, she argued (1) that § 202(a) should not
have been construed as applicable to transactions completed before the
enactment of the statute," and (2) that if the section were construed to
apply where both gift and sale were completed before such enactment, the
section was arbitrary and capricious, and thus violated the due process
In upholding the tax statute, the Court summarily dismissed
clause."
the petitioner's claims and distinguished the cases relied upon by the
petitioner. 24 Justice McReynolds stated that "none of these cases is in
point; they give no consideration to the power of Congress to require that
taxable income should include profits from transactions consummated
within the year."" Apparently, the Court viewed the holdings in the
earlier gift tax cases to be narrow, that is, not dispositive in retroactive
income tax cases. 26 However, the Court suggested that the tax year of
enactment was the limit of permissible retroactivity. 27
The following year, the Supreme Court decided Milliken v. United
States,"-8 which involved the retroactive gift tax statute at issue in
119. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, §§ 202(a)(2), 263 (effective date), 42 Stat. 227,
229, 271.

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id.; see Cooper, 280 U.S. at 410.
Cooper, 280 U.S. at 410-11.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 411-12.
The court stated that it found nothing "unusual, arbitrary, or capricious" in

the provision in question. Id. at 412.

126. See id. at 411-12.
127. Id. at 412.
128. 283 U.S. 15 (1931).
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Nichols. 29 Justice Stone delivered the opinion of the Court. 3 ' In
December 1916, petitioners' decedent transferred, inter vivos, shares of
corporate stock to his children.'
The Revenue Act of September 8,
1916 was in effect at the time of the transfer.'
The transferor died on
March 5, 1920. 1"
The government considered the gifts to have been made in
contemplation of death."34 Therefore, under § 402(c) of the Revenue
Act of 1918, the Commissioner included the value of the stock in the
decedent's estate and collected the tax. 3 For purposes of the tax, the
stock was valued at the time of the decedent's death. 3 6 The rates in the
retroactive amendment (the 1918 Act) were higher than those in the
original version of the statute (the 1916 Act). 37 The petitioners
challenged the tax as being "illegally exacted under the decedent's estates
provisions of the Revenue Act of 1918." 111 The petitioners also pointed
out that
Section 402[(c)] provided for the inclusion [of the value of
property] in the gross estate . . ."[t]o the extent of any interest
therein of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer.
. in contemplation of or intended to take effect in possession or
enjoyment at or after his death (whether such transfer or trust is
made or created before or after the passage of this act)."'
The Court relied on dicta in Nichols in holding that the inclusion in the
gross estate of the value of gifts made in contemplation of death to secure
equality of taxation and to prevent evasion of taxes is a permissible
classification of an appropriate subject of taxation. 140
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 19; see supra notes 68-85 and accompanying text.
Milliken, 283 U.S. at 18.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 19.
Id.

136. Id.
137. Id.

138. Id. at 18.
139. Id. at 19.
140. Id. at 23-24.
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The Court considered the nature of the tax and the decedent's
gift.' 4 ' With the 1916 Revenue Act, Congress adopted the system of
taxation of transfers of property at death or in contemplation of death that
already existed in forty-two states. 42 Sections 202(b) of the 1916 Act
and 402(c) of the 1918 Act imposed a tax on gifts made in contemplation
of death, to be computed at the same value and rate as property that had
been part of the donor's estate passing at death. 3
The question for the Court was not whether the gift of property should
be taxed at all. Instead, the gift was assumed to be in contemplation of
death, and the question was whether the donor should be taxed at the 1916
rates or the 1918 rates. The Court upheld the 1918 statute'" and stated:
"Underlying the present statute is the policy of taxing... gifts [made in
contemplation of death] equally with testamentary dispositions, for which
they may be substituted, and the prevention of evasion of estate taxes by
gifts made before, but in contemplation of death." 45 Moreover, the
Court determined that the public policy, as well as the parallel 1916 gift
and estate tax rate and valuation provisions, gave the decedent notice of
the taxes that would be assessed on the particular gifts,'" and thus, the
decedent took a risk in making the transfers. 47
In 1938, in Welch v. Henry, the Supreme Court returned to the
question of the constitutionality of a retroactive income tax provision."
The Wisconsin statute at issue 149 imposed a tax on dividend income that
According to the Court,
had formerly been excluded from taxation.5'
the taxpayer suffered no detriment because he had not incurred any extra
expense or changed his conduct in any way in reliance on the tax law as
141. Id. at 22.
142. See id. (citing S. REP. No. 793, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1916) (Senate Comm.
on Finance); H.R. REP. No. 922, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1916) (House Comm. on Ways
and Means); H.R. REP. No. 16763, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1916)).
143. See Milliken, 283 U.S. at 22 n.2. As of 1916, 29 states and one territory
imposed taxes on gifts in contemplation of death at the same rate as on estates passing
at death. Most provided for appraisal of the property as of the date of the decedent's
death. See id.
144. See id. at 24. The Court referred to the tax at issue as one to be supported as
"an incident and in aid of the exercise of the constitutional power to levy a tax on the
transfer of the decedent's estate at death." Id.
145. Id. at 23.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. 305 U.S. 134, 141 (1938).
149. 1935 Wis. Laws ch. 15, § 6.
150. See Welch, 305 U.S. at 141.
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it stood before retroactive amendment.'
The Court held that the tax
was not so "harsh and oppressive as to transgress the constitutional
limitation."152 The Court explained that it could "not assume that
stockholders would refuse to receive corporate dividends even if they
knew that their receipt would later be subjected to a new tax or to the
increase of an old one."'
The Court stated in dicta, however, that the
outcome of Welch would have been different if the transaction taxed
therein had been "completely vested [as in the Nichols line of casesT ]
before the enactment of the taxing statute," s5 and if "the nature or
amount of the tax could not reasonably have been anticipated by the
taxpayer at the time of the56particular voluntary act which the statute later
made the taxable event."
It was not until 1981, after a hiatus of more than forty years, that the
Court returned to the issue of the constitutionality of retroactive tax
legislation." 5
In United States v. Darusmont,'51 a taxpayer
unsuccessfully challenged a retroactive change that increased the minimum
tax on a completed sale of real estate.5 9 Unlike the taxpayers in the
cases from the first half of the twentieth century, 6 ' the petitioner in
Darusmont did not actually know of or rely on the relevant preamendment law.' 61 The taxpayer "conceded . . . that when he was
considering the various ways in which he could dispose of62[his] property,
he was not aware of the existence of the minimum tax."
The Court held that the taxpayer had constructive notice of the
retroactive tax increase. The Court held that the taxpayer was "hardly in
a position to claim surprise at the 1976 amendments to the minimum tax"
because the "proposed increase in rate hadbeen under public consideration
151. Carlton v. United States, 972 F.2d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S.
Ct. 2018 (1994).
152. Welch, 305 U.S. at 147.
153. Id.at 148; see also Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1058.
154. Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U.S. 440 (1928); Nichols v. Coolidge 274 U.S.
531 (1927); Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142 (1927).
155. Welch, 305 U.S. at 147; see also supra notes 66-109 and accompanying text.
156. Welch, 305 U.S. at 147.

157.
158.
159.
160.

See United States v. Darusmont, 449 U.S. 292 (1981) (per curiam).
Id.
Id. at 294-95.
See Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U.S. 440 (1928); Nichols v. Coolidge, 274

U.S. 531 (1927); Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142 (1927).
161. Darusmont, 449 U.S. at 295; see also Carlton v. United States, 972 F.2d

1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 2018 (1994).
162. Darusmont, 449 U.S. at 295.
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for almost a year before its enactment." 163 The Court stated that the
1976 amendments merely "decreas[ed] the allowable exemption and
increas[ed] the percentage rate of tax," 164 and explained that the
petitioner was in a far different position from an individual who had no
reason to suspect that any transactions of the sort would be taxed at
all. 16
In 1986, in United States v. Hemme, taxpayers challenged on due
166
process grounds a statute that retroactively applied a tax on gifts.
Like the taxpayer in Welch, the petitioners in Hemme did not
detrimentally rely on the statute in question, 67 and the Court focused on
this fact in upholding the statute.' 6S The Court stated that even under
the retroactive application of the transitional rule, the taxpayers "still have
paid estate taxes of $655.16 less than they would have paid had the 1976
act never been passed" 69 and thus, "the retroactive aspect of the law
1 As in Darusmont,
could not be said to be oppressive or inequitable." 70
the Court held in Hemme that the taxpayer had constructive notice.' 7 ,
It stated: "[Section] 2035 had long been in effect at the time [the decedent]
made his gift, and it is § 2035 that contains the principle retroactive
feature involved in this case, requiring the estate to reach back and
embrace a gift made over [two] years previously.""
IV. THE CARLTON CASE

A. Facts
The TRA of 1986, codified as 26 U.S.C. § 2057, became law on
October 22, 1986.21 Section 2057 provided, inter alia, that an estate
163. Darusmont,449 U.S. at 299 (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-658, 94th Cong. 130132 (1975), S.REP. No. 94-938, 94th Cong. 108-114 (1976)); see also Carlton, 972
F.2d at 1058.

164. Darusmont, 449 U.S. at 299; see also Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1058.
165. Darusmont, 449 U.S. at 300.
166. 476 U.S. 558, 564 (1986).
167. Id.at 570-71.
168. See id.
169. Id. at 571; see also Carlton v. United States, 972 F.2d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir.
1992), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 2018 (1994).
170. Hemme,476 U.S. at 571; see also Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1058.
171. Hemme,476 U.S. at 571.
172. Id.
173. See Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1053; The Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.99514, § 1172, 100 Stat. 2085, 2513-15 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 2057 (repealed 1989)).
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could deduct half the proceeds of a sale of securities to an ESOP from a

decedent's gross estate ("the ESOP proceeds deduction").

The effect

of the ESOP proceeds deduction was to place half of that part of the estate
that consisted of money received from the sale of securities to an ESOP
beyond the reach of the federal estate tax.75 In order to qualify for the
174. 26 U.S.C. § 2057 (repealed 1989). The statute read in its entirety:
Sec. 2057. SALES OF EMPLOYER SECURITIES TO EMPLOYEE STOCK
OWNERSHIP PLANS OR WORKER-OWNED COOPERATIVES.
(a) GeneralRule.-For purposes of the tax imposed by section 2001, the
value of the taxable estate shall be determined by deducting from the
value of the gross estate an amount equal to 50 percent of the qualified
proceeds of a qualified sale of employer securities.
(b) QualifiedSale.-For purposes of this section, the term "qualified sale"
means any sale of employer securities by the executor of an estate to(1) an employee stock ownership plan... described in section 4975(e)(7), or
(2) an eligible worker-owned cooperative (within the meaning of section
1042(c))
(c) QualifiedProceeds.-Forpurposes of this section(1) In general.-The term "qualified proceeds" means the amount
received by the estate from the sale of employer securities at any time
before the date on which the return of the tax imposed by section 2001 is
required to be filed (including any extensions).
(2) Proceedsfrom certain securities not qualfied.-The term "qualified
proceeds" shall not include the proceeds from the sale of any employer
securities if such securities were received by the decedent(A) in a distribution from a plan exempt from tax under section
501(a) which meets the requirements of section 401(a), or
(B) as a transfer pursuant to an option or other right to acquire stock
to which section 83, 422, 422A, 423, or 424 applies.
(d) Written Statement Required.(1) In general.-Nodeduction shall be allowed under subsection (a) unless
the executor of the estate of the decedent files with the Secretary the
statement described in paragraph (2).
(2) Statement.-A statement is described in this paragraph if it is a
verified written statement of(A) the employer whose employees are covered by the plan described in
subsection (b)(1), or
(B) any authorized officer of the cooperative described in subsection
(b)(2), consenting to the application of section 4979A with respect to such
employer or cooperative.
(e) Employer Securities.-For purposes of this section, the term
"employer securities" has the meaning given such term by section 409(1).
(f)
Termination.-Thissection shall not apply to any sale after December
31, 1991.
Id.
175. Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1053.
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deduction under § 2057 of the Internal Revenue Code, the estate would
176
have to timely file its return after the enactment date of the TRA.
Thus, the filing deadline, not the date of the decedent's death, would
determine whether the estate qualified for the deduction,'
On October 18, 1986, the 99th Congress adjourned.17 8 Between the
passage of the TRA on September 27, 1986 and adjournment, the
179
legislature considered hundreds of potential amendments to the TRA.
Among the numerous proposed amendments, only one related to §
2057.1
This amendment involved the deletion of an extraneous
"is."181 In Carlton, it was undisputed that during the period between the
adjournment of Congress on October 18, 1986, and passage of the TRA
of 1986 "[n]o bill or resolution was introduced that would have added any
condition to the availability of the new [§] 2057 deduction other than those
contained in the statute itself."'8
On September 29, 1985, Willametta K. Day died, and Jerry W.
Carlton was duly appointed executor of her will."u Due to a filing
extension not at issue in Carlton," Day's estate tax return was not due
until December 29, 1986.11 Thus, in terms of timeliness, the Day
estate was eligible for the § 2057 deduction."s
Carlton, as executor of the Day estate, specifically relied on § 2057
when, on December 10, 1986, he purchased 1.5 million shares of MCI
Communications Corporation at an average price of $7.47 per share, for
a total price of $11,206,000,'" and two days later, on December 12,
1986, he agreed to sell the shares to an MCI ESOP at $7.05 per
share.' 88 The ESOP's purchase price was not only below the price at
which Carlton purchased the shares, but also approximately 26 cents
below the mean market price that day.' 89 The MCI ESOP was a
176. 26 U.S.C. § 2057 (repealed 1989); see Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1053.
177. See Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1053; 26 U.S.C. § 2057(c)(1) (repealed 1989).
178. See Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1053.

179. Id.
180. See id.
181. Id. (The parties stipulated this fact).
182. Id.
183. Id.

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1054.
Id.
Id.
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qualifying ESOP within the meaning of § 2057. '1 MCI purchased the
shares for $10,575,000, or $631,000 below the estate's purchase
price.' 9' As executor, Carlton neither would have bought nor sold the
stocks in question," 0 and the MCI ESOP would not have received the
stocks at a discount, but for the § 2057 deduction. 93
On December 29, 1986, Carlton timely filed the estate tax return in
which, pursuant to § 2057, he deducted (from the gross estate) fifty
percent of the proceeds of the sale to the ESOP, $5,287,000. '1 Carlton
then paid a net estate tax of $18,752,250. 9 The § 2057 transaction
96
with the MCI ESOP thus saved the Day estate $2,501,161 in taxes.
On January 5, 1987, the IRS stated in an advance version of Notice
87-13 that pending the enactment of a clarifying statute," 9 the IRS
would not honor a deduction pursuant to § 2057 if the decedent had not
owned the securities in question immediately before death (the "decedent
ownership requirement"). 98 This notice was officially published on
January 26, 1987.1' 9 Thus, the decedent ownership requirement did not
appear in the 1986 version of § 2057 or in any amendments to the TRA
proposed before the 99th Congress adjourned and the transactions at issue
in Carlton occurred before the issuance of the IRS notice on what § 2057
required.'
On February 26, 1987, a bill was introduced in the 100th Congress
to enact into law the decedent ownership requirement."0 ' The bill
became law (the "1987 Amendment") on December 22, 198721 and
retroactively applied the decedent ownership requirement as if the original
version of the TRA contained such a requirement.'
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
101 Stat.

See id.; 26 U.S.C. § 2057(b)(1) (repealed 1989).
Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1054.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Id. at 1055.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see I.R.S. Notice 87-17, 1987-1 C.B. 432, 442-43.
Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1055.
Id.
Id.; see Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, Pub.L. No. 100-203, § 10411,
1330, 1330-432 (1987).
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The 1987 amendment was labeled a "Congressional Clarification of
Its
Estate Tax Deduction for Sales of Employer Securities."'
legislative history contained the following Committee Report statement:
"As drafted, the estate tax deduction was significantly broader than what
was originally contemplated by Congress in enacting the provision. The
committee believes it is necessary to conform the statute to the original
intent of Congress in order to prevent a significant revenue loss under the
[TRA]."1 5 The net deficiency attributable to Carlton's § 2057 claim
SEC. 10411. CONGRESSIONAL CLARIFICATION OF ESTATE TAX
DEDUCTION FOR SALES OF EMPLOYER SECURITIES.
(a) Intent of Congress in Enacting Section 2057 of the InternalRevenue
Code of 1986.-Section 2057 (relating to sales of employer securities to
employee stock ownership plans or worker-owned cooperatives) is amended
by redesignating subsections (d), (e), and (f) as subsections (e), (f), and (g),
respectively, and by inserting after subsection (c) the following new
subsection:
(d) Qualified Proceeds From Qualified Sales.(1) In general.-Forpurposes of this section, the proceeds of a
sale of employer securities by an executor to an employee stock
ownership plan or an eligible worker-owned cooperative shall not be
treated as qualified proceeds from a qualified sale unless(A) the decedent directly owned the securities immediately
before death, and
(B) after the sale, the employer securities(i) are allocated to participants, or
(ii) are held for future allocation in connection with (I) an
exempt loan under the rules of section 4975, or (11) a transfer
of assets under the rules of section 4980(c)(3).
(2) No substitutionpermitted.-Forpurposes
of paragraph (1)(b), except in the case of a bona fide business
transaction (e.g., a substitution of employer securities in
connection with a merger of employers), employer securities
shall not be treated as allocated or held for future allocation to
the extent that such securities are allocated or held for future
allocation in substitution of other employer securities that had
been allocated or held for future allocation.
(b) Effective Date.-The amendments made by subsection (a) shall take
effect as if included in the amendments made by section 1172 of the Tax
Reform Act of 1986.
Id.
204. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, § 10411; Carlton, 972 F.2d at 105455.
205. H.R. REp. No. 100-391, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, 1045 (1987), reprinted
in 4 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313-1, 2313-661 (1987).
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This was the only deficiency in dispute in

Carlton paid the total deficiency, $3,385,333, plus $996,953.18 in
interest. 203 Subsequently, Carlton filed a refund claim for the amount
of the deficiency attributable to the ESOP proceeds deduction.2 ' 9 The
IRS denied Carlton's refund claim; 21° and on October 11, 1990, Carlton
filed a refund action in the United States District Court for the Central
District of California for $2,501,161 plus interest, costs, and attorney's
fees.21'
In the district court, the parties agreed to an order narrowing the
potential issues.212 The government conceded that under § 2057 as
passed in 1986, the estate was entitled to the ESOP proceeds
deduction 2 and that if the 1987 Amendment's retroactive application
violated the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, then Carlton was
entitled to judgment." 4 Carlton conceded that if the 1987 amendment
could be applied retroactively to his transaction consistent with due
process, then (1) the estate would not be entitled to the ESOP proceeds
deduction, (2) there would be no other grounds for claiming the refund,
and (3) the respondent would therefore be entitled to judgment.215
Therefore, the district court granted the government's motion for
summary judgment.2 16 The court held that the retroactive application of
the 1987 amendment to Carlton's transaction did not violate due process
because the amendment did not impose a "wholly new tax." 21 7 The
court rejected the petitioner's Contract Clause and Takings Clause
arguments,2 18 and Carlton did not raise those issues on appeal.21 9

206. Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1055.

207. Id.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

216.
217.
218.
219.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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B. The Rationality Test: No Check on the Legislature
Both the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court reviewed the question

of the constitutionality of the 1987 amendment to 26 U.S.C. § 2057.n
Unlike the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court did not adopt the single

standard it had consistently applied over the past half century to determine
whether the retroactive application of certain tax statutes satisfied due

process requirements. "'

Thus, where the Ninth Circuit weighed the

"nature of the tax and the circumstances in which it [was] laid"' in
order to determine whether the retroactivity was so "harsh and
oppressive" as to be unconstitutional, the Supreme Court applied a rational
means test generally applied to "retroactive" economic legislation.'
The Supreme Court stated: "[P]rovided that the retroactive application of
a statute is supported by a legitimate legislative purpose furthered by
rational means, judgments about the wisdom of such legislation remain
within the exclusive province of the legislative and executive branches.
. ."I
"
In deferring to the legislature under such circumstances, the
Court enhanced Congress's powers to enact retroactive tax legislation and
thereby limit individuals' rights.'
220. Id. (citing Licari v. Commissioner, 946 F.2d 690, 692 (9th Cir. 1991)); see
United States v. Carlton, 114 S. Ct. 2018, 2020 (1994).
221. See United States v. Carlton, 114 S. Ct. 2018, 2024 (1994) (applying the
rationality standard).
222. Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1055.
223. Carlton, 114 S. Ct. at 2022 (quoting Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v.
R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 733 (1984) for the proposition that the "harsh and
oppressive" standard "does not differ from the prohibition against arbitrary and
irrational legislation").
224. Id. (quoting Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1976))
(emphasis added).
225. Justice Scalia, concurring, pointed out that the new standard the majority
applied
guarantee[d] that all retroactive tax laws [would thereafter] be valid. To pass
constitutional muster the retroactive aspects of the statute need only be
"rationally related to a legitimate legislative purpose." Revenue raising is
certainly a legitimate legislative purpose, see U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 1,
and any law that retroactively adds a tax, removes a deduction, or increases
a rate rationally furthers that goal.
Carlton, 114 S. Ct. at 2027 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citation omitted). See also Heller
v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637 (1993); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729 (1963) (noting
that there was a time when the Supreme Court, using the Due Process Clause would
strike down laws that it thought were unreasonable, i.e., unwise or incompatible with
some particular economic or social philosophy (citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45 (1905) (striking down as violative of due process a law setting maximum hours for
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The Supreme Court applied to a retroactive law the due process
standard generally applied to prospective laws. The Court overlooked the
emphasis its precedent placed on the factors of notice and reliance. 6
The Court, however, did not acknowledge that it was ignoring
precedent. 7 The Court stated that retroactive legislation has to meet
a burden different from that faced by prospective legislation,' yet it did
not define that burden.'
It stated that both prospective and retroactive
legislation must meet the rationality test of due process and that the
justifications for the former may be insufficient for the latter. 21
Nevertheless, it opined that the rationality test,"' which is generally
used for prospective legislation, 1 2 is applicable to retroactive
legislation. 3 Thus, the Court was unclear as to how the rationality test
differ from one the Court would apply to a prospective statute.
C. Nature & Circumstances
Both the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit rejected the notion of
a per se rule of invalidity where the statute applied retroactively.'
The
work in bakeries); Jay Bums Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 (1924) (holding that
a statute fixing the weight of loaves of bread violated the Due Process Clause); Adkins
v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (striking down under Due Process Clause
a statute establishing minimum wages for women); and Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1
(1915) (court used the Due Process Clause to nullify a law prohibiting yellow dog
contracts).
226. See discussion supra part II; see also Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 147
(1938); Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U.S. 440, 445 (1928); Nichols v. Coolidge, 274
U.S. 531, 542 (1927); Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 147 (1927).
227. Carlton, 114 S. Ct. at 2023 (rejecting the respondent's "detrimental reliance"
and "lack of notice" arguments).
228. Id. at 2022 (citing Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 16-17
(1976)).
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. (stating that retroactive application of legislation is justified by "a rational
legislative purpose").
232. Id.
233. Id. at 2024.
234. Id. at 2022; Carlton v. United States, 972 F.2d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 1992)
(noting the Supreme Court had "'made clear that some retrospective effect is not
necessarily fatal to a revenue law.' [United States v.] Hemme, 476 U.S. [558], 10568
[(1986)] ....
Thus, retroactivity alone will not condemn a congressional enactment.")
(emphasis added); id. at 1062 (stating that "[w]e do not doubt the power of Congress to
apply legislation retroactively to the time such legislation was introduced or even to the
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Supreme Court reasoned that where the original version of § 2057 had no
decedent ownership requirement, "any estate could claim the deduction
simply by buying stock in the market and immediately reselling it to an
ESOP, thereby obtaining a potentially dramatic reduction in, (or
elimination of), the estate tax obligation."" The Court thus concluded
that the 1987 amendment was adopted as a "curative measure."216 The
cure was to prevent the expected revenue loss under § 2057 as originally
enacted of $7 billion over a five-year period. Here, the Court raises an
irrelevant point, however, because Congress did not need to make the
amendment to § 2057 retroactive in order to prevent the $7 billion loss-a
prospective amendment would have been a sufficient cure. 7 By
characterizing the amendment as a mere cure, the Court ignored not only
the executor's lack of notice (constructive and actual), but also the
financial burden the measure imposed on the Day estate ($631,000).8
Moreover, as Justice O'Connor reasoned, labeling the amendment as a
cure will lead the Court to always conclude that the retroactivity served
a legitimate legislative purpose: 2 9
Every law touching on an area in which Congress has previously
legislated can be said to serve the legislative purpose of fixing a
perceived problem with the prior state of affairs-there is no
reason to pass a new law, after all, if the legislators are satisfied
with the old one. 2'

time such legislation was proposed by the executive branch."), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 2018
(1994); see also Purvis v. United States, 501 F.2d 311, 313-14 (9th Cir. 1974), cert.

denied, 420 U.S. 947 (1975).
235. Carlton, 114 S. Ct. at 2022.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 2022.
238. See id. at 2026 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The Court attempts to minimize the
amendment's harshness by characterizing it as a 'curative measure'.. . . however, what

was done to respondent here went beyond a cure."). The retroactivity not only restored
the tax Congress "meant" to originally impose, "but it caused [Carlton's] expenditures
[$631,000] incurred in invited reliance upon the earlier law to become worthless." Id.
Note, a "curative measure" has been defined as legislation that applied retroactively in
order to meet the expectations of the interested parties, not of the legislature. Queen v.
Millis, 10 Cl. & F. 534 (1844).

239. Id. at 2025 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
240. Id.
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Both courts also rejected a per se rule of validity where the amendment
did not apply a "wholly new" 241 tax.242 However, both courts'
opinions were only aligned to the extent that they rejected the per se rules
of validity and invalidity.2 3
In considering the nature of the tax and the circumstances in which it
was laid, the appellate court perceived no "rigid standard of
constitutionality in the decided cases[;]" 24 thus it was "guided . . .by
the more flexible criteria delineated by the Supreme Court in Welch v.

Henry ....

245

The Ninth Circuit followed precedent and analyzed Carlton based on
two factors-notice and reliance. 6 The court stated:
From [the earlier retroactive tax cases], two circumstances
emerge as of paramount importance in determining whether the
retroactive application of a tax is unduly harsh and oppressive.
First, did the taxpayer have actual or constructive notice that the
tax statute would be retroactively amended? Second, did the
taxpayer rely to his detriment on the pre-amendment tax statute,
and was such reliance reasonable?247
Conversely, the Supreme Court dismissed its historical approach to
retroactive gift and estate tax statutes,24 8 stating that Nichols, Blodgett,
241. Id. at 2024 (distinguishing the ESOP proceeds deduction from "the nation's
first gift tax" at issue in Blodgett and Untermyer).
242. Carlton v. United States, 972 F.2d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that the

Supreme Court's most recent decisions regarding retroactivity challenges to tax statutes,
United States v. Hemme, 476 U.S. 558 (1986) and United States v. Darusmont, 449
U.S. 292 (1981) (per curiam) did not involve wholly new taxes, but nonetheless, the

Supreme Court thoroughly analyzed the circumstances of each retroactive application in
determining whether the statutes were constitutional), rev'd, 114 S.Ct. 2018 (1994).
243. ld.
244. Id. (quoting Purvis v. United States, 501 F.2d 311, 313 (9th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 947 (1975)).
245. Id. (quoting Purvis v. United States, 501 F.2d 311, 313 (9th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 947 (1975)).
246. Id. at 1059.
247. Id.
248. The Court dismissed precedent of the gift and estate tax cases-that is,Nichols,
Blodgett, Untermyer-and followed the income tax cases, e.g., Welch v. Henry. See
discussion supra part Ell (discussing these cases). The Supreme Court simply ignored
the notice and reliance factors, which weighed heavily in the gift and estate tax cases,

in order to determine whether the 1987 amendment to 26 U.S.C. § 2057 violated
Carlton's due process rights. See United States v. Carlton, 114 S.Ct. 2018, 2023
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and Untermyer were cases decided during "an era characterized by

exacting review of economic legislation under an approach that 'has long
since been discarded.'"249 In other words, the Court relieved itself of
adhering to precedent, history, and tradition. In dismissing the Nichols
line of cases in this way, the Court relied on Ferguson v. SkupaY 0 but

inappropriately
extended Ferguson to the facts of the gift and estate tax
25
cases. 1

The Ferguson Court was referring to Lochner v. New Yore3 2 and
its progeny. The cases involved the Supreme Court's practice of striking
down laws it thought "unreasonable, that is, unwise, or incompatible with
some particular economic or social philosophy.""
Lochner v. New

York involved a New York law that limited the hours which a bakery
employee could work to ten per day and sixty per week.'

The Court

(1994).
249. Id. at 2024 (quoting Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963)). In his
concurrence, Justice Scalia pointed out that "economic legislation was not the only
legislation subjected to 'exacting review' in those bad old days." Id. at 2027 (Scalia, J.,
concurring). Justice Scalia questioned the Court's rationale for "'discarding' that bad old
approach only as to that category." Id. After all, "the Court continues to rely upon
'exacting review' cases of the Nichols-Blodgett-Untermyer vintage for its due-process
'fundamental rights' jurisprudence." Id. (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53
(1973); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965) ("we reaffirm
the principle of the Pierceand Meyer cases.")).
Justice Scalia wrote:
The picking and choosing among various rights to be accorded
"substantive due process" protection is alone enough to arouse suspicion; but
the categorical and inexplicable exclusion of so-called "economic rights" (even
though the Due Process Clause explicitly applies to "property") unquestionably
involves policymaking rather than neutral legal analysis. I would follow the
text of the Constitution, which sets forth certain substantive rights that cannot
be taken away, and adds, beyond that, a right to due process when life,
liberty, or property is to be taken away.
Carlton, 114 S. Ct. at 2027 (Scalia, J., concurring).
250. 372 U.S. 726 (1963); see also Carlton, 114 S. Ct. at 2024.
251. See infra notes 258-60 and accompanying text.
252. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
253. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726,729 (1963) (citing Coppage v. Kansas,
236 U.S. 1 (1915) (prohibiting "yellow dog" contracts); Adkins v. Children's Hospital,
261 U.S. 525 (1923) (establishing minimum wages for women); Jay Bums Baking Co.
v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 (1924) (setting the weight of loaves of bread)).
254. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 65.
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struck down the statute as an abridgement of "liberty of contract," and
thus a violation of due process.2 5
In Lochner, the Supreme Court did not accept Congress's asserted
purposes for enacting the law, for example, that bakers need protection for
safety reasons and health reasons. Instead, the Court only considered the
legislature's actual purpose for enacting the law. It explained that the
statute would impose restrictions on individual bakers who wanted to work
more hours than allowed by the legislation-in other words, the law
unconstitutionally hampered an individual's liberty. Second, the Court did
not defer to legislative fact finding. The Court required a "close fit"
between the statute and the legislature's actual purpose. The Court stated:
It seems to us that the real object and purpose were simply to
regulate the hours of labor between the master and his
employ[ee]s (all being men, suijuris), in a private business, not
dangerous in any degree to morals or in any real and substantial
degree, to the health of the employ[ee]s.
Under such
circumstances the freedom of master and employ[ee] to contract
with each other in relation to their employment [cannot] be
prohibited or interfered with, without violating the Federal
Constitution. 6
The traditional criticism of Lochner is that the Court substituted its laissez
faire view of economics for the asserted will of the legislature. 7
Lochner, however, is distinguishable from the Nichols line of cases.
It is one thing to set for the future, maximum working hours for bakers;
it is quite another to determine that bakers in the past worked too many
hours and to penalize them for doing so. The Nichols line of cases were
not simply "Loclmerizing," or substituting the will of the justices for that
of the legislature. In Nichols, Blodgett, and Untermyer, the Supreme
Court did not question the "wisdom, need, or appropriateness of the
legislation. "" In this line of cases, the Court did not hold that it was
255. Id. at 64-65.
256. Id. at 64 (emphasis added).
257. See Lochner, 198 U.S. 45, 74-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[A]
constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of
paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the State or of laissezfaire."); see
also ROBERT G. MCCLOSKY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 106-08 (2d ed. 1994);
JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 362-64 (4th ed.
1991); Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner EraJurisprudenceand the American Constitutional
Tradition, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1991).
258. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963) (quoting Olsen v. Nebraska
ex rel. Western Reference & Bond Ass'n, 313 U.S. 236, 246 (1941)).
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unwise, unnecessary, or inappropriate for Congress to prevent revenue
loss."9 Instead, it considered whether the retroactive feature of each
statute, which not only denied the particular taxpayers the opportunity to
comply with the new laws, but also caused them to detrimentally rely on
the pre-amendment law, rendered the statutes arbitrary and irrational.5'
For retroactive statutes, Congress's having a rational basis for the
legislation is not sufficient protection for taxpayers. The rational basis for
the retroactive statute in Carlton was that Congress was correcting a
mistake it made in the Tax Reform Act of 1986.11 Under this
reasoning, it seems that even if Congress wanted to retroactively amend
a fifty-year old tax statute it could do so, by claiming that it had made a
mistake. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes stated in dissent in Lochner:
I think that the word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is
perverted when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a
dominant opinion, unless it can be said that a rational and fair
man necessarily would admit that the statute proposed would
infringe fundamental principles as they have been understood by
the traditions of our people and our law.'2
A very good argument could be made that retroactive lawmaking violates
the "fundamental principles as they have been understood by the traditions
of our people and our law," where such lawmaking does not give
taxpayers notice of what the law requires and where taxpayers rely on the
plain meaning of the enacted law to their detriment. From the time of St.
259. Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U.S. 440, 444-45 (1928); Blodgett v. Holden,
275 U.S. 142, 147 (1927); Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U.S. 531, 542-43 (1927).

260. Untermyer, 276 U.S. at 444-45; Blodgett, 275 U.S. at 147; Nichols, 274 U.S.
at 542-43. Both the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court viewed the harsh and
oppressive standard the same as the arbitrary and irrational standard. See Carlton v.
United States, 972 F.2d 1051, 1056 (noting that the harsh and oppressive standard "does
not differ from the prohibition against arbitrary and irrational legislation that [the
Supreme Court] clearly enunciated in Turner Elkhorn." (quoting Pension Benefit Guar.

Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co, 467 U.S. 717, 733 (1984)), rev'd, 114 S.Ct. 2018 (1994);
United States v. Carlton, 114 S.Ct. 2018, 2022 (1994) (stating that Welch and Hemme
used the harsh and oppressive standard). The harsh and oppressive formulation,
however, "does not differ from the prohibition against arbitrary and irrational legislation
that applies generally to enactments in the sphere of economic policy." Id. (quoting
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 467 U.S. at 2719-20). The Ninth Circuit, however, in
examining the Nichols line of cases, determined that what makes a retroactive statute
"irrational" is the extent to which it deprives taxpayers notice of what the law requires
and the extent to which citizens detrimentally rely on the unamended law.
261. See Carlton, 114 S.Ct. at 1054-55.
262. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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Thomas Aquinas,'

to the time of the debates at the Constitutional

Convention,' to, in this century, the Nichols line of cases,265 there
has been hostility toward retroactive lawmaking. The hostility is based on
the premise that the law-abiding citizen should be protected from the
spectre of Congress legislating nunc pro tunc. The courts should provide
such protection by examining the tax legislation to see if it provides notice
and whether or not the unamended law has been detrimentally relied upon.
The next two sections explore the concepts of "notice" and "reliance," in
an attempt to show that the Nichols line of cases were not merely
"Lochnerizing."
D. Notice
A common thread that runs through the cases in which the Supreme
Court upheld the challenged retroactive statute was that the taxpayer had
either actual or constructive notice that his/her transfers or income would
be taxed.'
Unlike those taxpayers, Carlton had neither constructive
nor actual notice of the 1987 amendment imposing the decedent ownership
263. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
264. See supra note 57.
265. See suprapart I (discussing these cases).
266. See United States v. Hemme, 476 U.S. 558, 571 (1986); United States v.
Darusmont, 449 U.S. 292, 299 (1981); Milliken v. United States, 283 U.S. 15, 23
(1931). But see Licari v. Commissioner, 946 F.2d 690, 695 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that
although the statute in question failed to warn petitioners that their conduct would subject
them to increased penalties, petitioners' bad faith conduct relieved the statute of its harsh
and oppressive nature). Petitioners underpaid their taxes and challenged a statute that
retroactively increased the penalty rate for such illegal conduct from 10% to 25%. Id.
at 692. In upholding the statute, the Court carefully pointed out:
Here, we are not presented with a case in which an individual acted in
accordance with the law as it stood at the time only later to be subjected to a
penalty; instead, those subjected to the increased penalties, like the Licaris,
knew at the time that they filed their return that they were not acting in
accordance with the law and could be subjected to a fine. .

.

.Under these

circumstances, we do not find imposition of the increased penalty unduly
"harsh and oppressive."
Id. at 695; see also Carlton v. United States, 972 F.2d 1051, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 1992),
rev'd, 114 S.Ct. 2018 (1994). Cf. Untermyer, 276 U.S. at 440 (taxpayer completed
gifts after the retroactive amendment was proposed to Congress but before it was
enacted); Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 142 (taxpayer made gifts before provision
in question was even presented to Congress for consideration); Nichols, 274 U.S. at 531
(striking down retroactive statute where the Court found that taxpayer had neither actual
nor constructive notice that the trust corpus would be taxed as part of her estate when
she created the trust 12 years before the challenged statute was enacted).
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requirement when he completed the MCI ESOP transaction in 1986.67
The decedent ownership requirement was not part of the proposed
amendments that Congress considered before it adjourned on October 18,
1986.11 The first proposal to amend § 2057 to include a decedent
ownership requirement was not made until January 5, 19872 9 and
Congress did not consider the bill to enact the IRS proposal until February
26, 1987. z ° "Hence, no act of the executive or legislative branch
would have given any forewarning of the 1987 amendment at the time the
MCI ESOP transaction occurred."" T
The government relied on two fleeting references in Congressional
documents in arguing that Carlton should be charged with constructive
notice of the amendment to the TRA. z n However, the references
merely stated that the ESOP proceeds deduction would be available to a
decedent who sold his or her company to an employee group.'
Nowhere in the legislative history did it state that the ESOP proceeds
deduction would be limited to such a situation.'24
Notably, of the two references, one was in a pamphlet written by the
staff of the Joint Committee of Taxation in September 1985. z7 The
Court of Appeals said that "[tihe pamphlet does not purport to speak for
Congress or even a congressional committee, and was prepared over a
year before passage of the TRA. Its value as legislative history is
doubtful. "276 In support of its position, the government also referred to
a floor statement made by Senator Russell Long, "which was at best
ambiguous."' m The Court of Appeals concluded that Carlton did not
267.
268.
269.
270.

Carlton, 114
Carlton, 114
Carlton, 114
Carlton, 114

S.
S.
S.
S.

Ct.
Ct.
Ct.
Ct.

at 2023;
at 2021;
at 2021;
at 2021;

Carlton, 972
Carlton, 972
Carlton, 972
Carlton, 972

F.2d
F.2d
F.2d
F.2d

at
at
at
at

1059.
1053.
1054.
1053.

271. Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1059.
272. Id. (recounting that the government referred to a pamphlet written by the staff
of the Joint Committee on Taxation (Sept. 1985) and to a floor statement made by
Senator Russell Long).

273. Id.
274. See id.

275. Id.
276. Id. at 1059.

277. Id. (footnote omitted); Judge O'Scannlain, who authored the Ninth Circuit
opinion wrote, "[i]nterestingly, while the government argues that this statement gave
constructive notice to Carlton, the government itself was apparently unaware of it at the
time it filed its brief and only brought it to our attention on the eve of oral argument."
Id. at 1058 n.7.
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have constructive notice that an amendment proposing a decedent
ownership requirement would be forthcoming.2 78
Unlike the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court did not consider
Carlton's lack of notice regarding the decedent ownership requirement to
be material.279 The Court stated that in Welch v. Henry, the Court
"upheld the retroactive imposition of a tax despite the absence of advance
legislation."'
However, in Welch, the Court refused to assume that the
taxpayer would have rejected dividends even if he knew that his receipt
of them would later be subjected to a new or increased tax." In Welch,
the Court stated that a different case would be presented where a
transaction was taxed that was "completely vested before the enactment of
the taxing statute,"m and "the nature or amount of the tax could not
reasonably have been anticipated by the taxpayer at the time of the
particular voluntary act which the statute later made the taxable
event."'
One can reasonably conclude that, unlike the taxpayer in
Welch who most likely would have continued to accept the dividend
income even inlight of a new or increased tax, Carlton would not have
engaged in the ESOP transaction had he known about the decedent
ownership requirement.'
Furthermore, in Milliken v. United States,' the Court held that in
view of the legislature's system-already in place under the preamendment law-to tax equally gifts made in contemplation of death with
testamentary dispositions, the taxpayer had constructive notice that the tax
would increase.'
Even if Carlton knew that Congress was promoting
employee ownership, however, he most likely would not have thought that
the legislature would impose a decedent ownership requirement on § 2057
278. Id. at 1059.
279. United States v. Carlton, 114 S. Ct. 2018, 2023 (1994). The Court cited
Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134 (1938) and Milliken v. United States, 283 U.S. 15
(1931), two cases where the Court upheld retroactive amendments to statutes "despite the
absence of advance notice of the legislation."
280. Carlton, 114 S.Ct. at 2023.
281. Welch, 305 U.S. at 148.
282. Id. at 147.
283. Id. (emphasis added).
284. See Carlton v. United States, 972 F.2d 1051, 1054 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114
S. Ct. 2018 (1994). Carlton intended to reduce the estate taxes, so he engaged in the
ESOP transaction. Had he known that the estate would not qualify for such a deduction
because it would not satisfy the decedent ownership requirement he would not have sold
the shares to the ESOP, at a loss of $631,000. See id.
285. 283 U.S. 15 (1931).
286. Id. at 23.
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because that would limit the number of estates that would qualify for a tax
27
deduction and thus indirectly would limit the sale of stock to ESOPs. 8
The cases that the Supreme Court relied on in determining that notice
was not a material factor 8 are distinguishable; therefore, those cases
are not controlling.
E. Reliance

Another common thread that runs through the cases in which the
Supreme Court upheld the retroactive tax statutes was that the taxpayer
had neither reasonably nor detrimentally relied on the original version of
the legislation. 9 Conversely, Carlton reasonably and detrimentally
relied on § 2057 as enacted in 1986. For example, in Welch, the
retroactive statute returned the taxpayer to the position he would have
been in had the Wisconsin legislature not been giving corporations special
tax treatment all along. 290 The petitioner in Welch had incurred no outof-pocket expenses due to the original statute. 9 On the other hand,
Carlton, as executor, detrimentally relied on the original version of §
2057, and as a result, the Day estate lost $631,000.29 Thus, unlike 293
the
taxpayer in Welch, the Day estate was not returned to the status quo.
287. See Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1058.
288. See Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134 (1938); Milliken, 283 U.S. at 15.
289. See Hemme v. United States, 476 U.S. 558, 571 (1986) (no detriment where
taxpayer actually saved over $600); United States v. Darusmont, 449 U.S. 292, 295
(1981) (per curiam) (no reliance where taxpayer was not aware of the original minimal
tax); Welch, 305 U.S. at 148 (noting that the taxpayer did not incur any extra expenses
or in any way change his actions in reliance on the law as it read before enactment of
the retroactive amendment); Milliken, 283 U.S. at 15; Cooper v. United States, 280 U.S.
409, 411 (1930) (citing Brushaber v. Union Pacific R.R., 240 U.S. 1 (1916) and Lynch
v. Hornby, 247 U.S. 339 (1918) for the proposition that a taxpayer suffers no detriment
in having to include in his or her taxable income the gain derived from the receipt and
subsequent sale of stock even where the gain was realized when it was not taxable).
290. Welch, 305 U.S. at 144.
291. Unlike the retroactive amendment in Carlton, the challenged amendment in
Welch did not require the plaintiff to pay any out-of-pocket expenses but merely to
include additional dividend income in his taxable income. Id. at 136.
292. Carlton v. United States, 972 F.2d 1051, 1061 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S.
Ct. 2018 (1994).
293. The Ninth Circuit stated: "The very fact that Carlton engaged in a costly
transaction for no other reason than the inducement provided by the new section 2057
makes this case significantly different from those rejecting a due process challenge to a
retroactively applied revenue law." Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1059-60.
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But the problem with what the Supreme Court did in Carlton goes
beyond both undoing a transaction completed in good faith and denying
the Day estate a substantial refund to which it was entitled. In upholding
the retroactive decedent ownership requirement, the Court sanctioned "bait
and switch" taxation.2'
The Court of Appeals rejected the government's argument that
Carlton's reliance was unreasonable, that is, that § 2057, as originally
enacted, was such a windfall that any reasonable taxpayer would have
known that it was too good to be true.2"
If the government was
correct, then Carlton's reliance was unreasonable because he had, in
effect, constructive notice that § 2057 as enacted and promulgated was
somehow a mistake. The Court of Appeals "flatly reject[ed] the
government's premise that a taxpayer cannot rely on the clear and
unequivocal text of the tax code, but instead must speculate on the
unspoken and inchoate intentions of Congress." 296
In the context of other tax incentives to encourage the development of
ESOPs, 2' § 2057, as first enacted, should not have raised any
eyebrows.2 9 According to the Joint Committee on Taxation,
[t]he tax expenditure for qualified plans is the largest single item
of tax expenditures. For the fiscal year 1986, the tax expenditure
for employer maintained qualified plans (including Keogh plans)
294. See United States v. Carlton, 114 S. Ct. 2018, 2026 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1060. Justice O'Scannlain wrote:
As intended, the Day estate succumbed to the lure and sold shares to the MCI

ESOP at a substantial discount. Section 2057 worked. An ESOP was able to
buy more shares at a lower price than before. Then, when the private actor
had completed the socially desirable action of selling shares at a discount to an
ESOP, the government reneged on its end of the deal. It was too late for
Carlton to undo his sale to the MCI ESOP. The $631,000 was gone forever,
irretrievable.
Id.
295. Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1060.
296. Id.
297. "The federal government has long sought to promote employee ownership of

shares in the employers. Section 2057 was enacted to induce taxpayers to sell shares at
a discounted price to an ESOP, thus furthering the public policy of employee
ownership." Id.

298. Id.
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is estimated to be $56.8 billion and this expenditure is projected
to increase to $88.9 billion for fiscal year 1990.29

The Joint Committee on Taxation estimated the total annual tax
expenditure of § 2057 as originally enacted, at $1.4 billion. 3" When
compared with $56 billion, the total tax expenditure to promote employee
investment ($1.4 billion) does not appear incredible.0 1 "Thus, even if
it were reasonable to expect that before a taxpayer would take a deduction
plainly available to him under the tax code, he would research the
estimated tax expenditure associated with such deduction, the tax
expenditure created by the ESOP proceeds deduction as originally enacted
was entirely plausible. " "
The government argued that the estate did not detrimentally rely on

the original version of § 2057;303 that the tax deduction was a benefit
bestowed on the estate by the legislature; and that the removal of the
299. Id. (citing STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., 1ST SESS.,
TAX REFORM PROPOSALS: TAX TREATMENT OF EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS
[ESOPs] 21 n.29 (Comm. Print 1985)).
300. Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1060.

301. Id.
302. Id.; Carlton would have had to hire an attorney to research the legislative
history. Such research would have been time consuming and costly and, perhaps,
inconclusive.
Even if Carlton had done all possible research in 1986 he would have discovered
the legislative purpose (to promote employee ownership) and a variety of other statutes
that Congress had enacted for the same purpose: he would have found legislation dealing
with other "qualified plans," including pension and profit-sharing plans, which had the
intended purpose and effect of raising $55.4 billion for the benefit of employees.
Id.
Carlton's research might also have turned up other legislation the federal
government enacted to encourage employee ownership. Examples of such legislation
include the Tax Reform Act of 1984, § 543, codified as 26 U.S.C. § 133 (excluding
from taxable income half the interest from bank loans made to an ESOP in order to
finance the purchase of shares) and § 541 of that Act, codified as 26 U.S.C. § 1042
(1984) (providing that taxpayers who sell shares to an ESOP may defer for tax purposes
the recognition of any capital gain on such sale). See Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1060.
Provisions such as these, would not lead a reasonable person to believe that the estate tax
exclusion allowed under § 2057 was "too good to be true."
Carlton had no reason to think that the decedent ownership requirement was
inadvertently omitted in a last minute drafting error. Section 2057 had been proposed
over two-and-one-half years before the TRA was finally passed; and in March, 1984, §
2057 as approved by the Senate Finance Committee, did not have a decedent ownership
requirement. Id.
303. Id. at 1061.
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benefit was not the equivalent of a detriment. 3" The government also
argued that the amendment simply restored the estate to the position it
would have been in had Congress not made the "mistake" in 1986 of
passing § 2057 without the decedent ownership requirement. 05
The Court of Appeals rejected the government's argument. 0 6 The
Court reasoned that although the estate incurred no greater tax liability
when Congress removed the deduction, the estate still suffered a loss due
to Carlton's reasonable reliance on the original version of § 2057.10
The Court of Appeals stated that to truly return the estate to the position
in which it would have been if the deduction never had been offered, the
government would have to pay the estate $631,000.308 In addition, the
Court of Appeals found that Welch, and especially Hemme, were
distinguishable from Carlton" because unlike Carlton, those cases did
not involve detrimental reliance.3"0 In Welch, when the special income
tax treatment the Wisconsin corporations had been receiving was removed,
the taxpayer was merely restored to the position he would have been in
had the preference never been enacted.3"
Similarly, in Hemme, the
taxpayer suffered no detriment, but actually was still in a better position
than he would have been in under the original taxing scheme.3t 2
Conversely, the Day estate decreased in value by $631,000 as a result of
Carlton's sale of stock to the ESOP. 1 3
Unlike the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court did not consider
Carlton's reliance on § 2057 material to his challenge of the retroactive
amendment."' Justice Blackmun wrote: "Although Carlton's reliance
is uncontested . . . his reliance alone is insufficient to establish a
304. Id.

305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id. (noting that "[tihe estate essentially 'paid' $631,000 (plus transactions costs,
such as brokerage and attorney fees, to receive the $2.5 million reduction in tax
liability)").

308. Id. Because the estate did not recover its "out-of-pocket" expenses, the removal
of the deduction did not put the estate in the position it would have been in had the
deduction never been offered. Cf. Hemme v. United States, 476 U.S. 558 (1986); Welch
v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134 (1938).
309. Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1061.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. United States v. Carlton, 114 S. Ct. 2018, 2023 (1994).
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constitutional violation. "31
Although reliance alone would not have
been sufficient grounds for striking down the challenged statute,316
precedent required that the Supreme Court consider reliance as one of two
factors in determining whether the statute was constitutional.3 17
Not only did the Supreme Court fail to attach significance to the issue
of reliance, but it also failed to acknowledge that the government's
curative measure cost Willametta K. Day's estate $631,000.318 Rather
than addressing the issue of detrimental reliance, Justice Blackmun
addressed the issue of the government's power to tax and the individual's
duty to pay taxes.319 He wrote: "Tax legislation is not a promise, and
"3
a taxpayer has no vested right in the Internal Revenue Code. 0
Furthermore, Justice Blackinun quoted Justice Stone, who explained in
Welch:
Taxation is neither a penalty imposed on the taxpayer nor a
liability which he assumes by contract. It is but a way of
apportioning the cost of government among those who in some
measure are privileged to enjoy its benefits and must bear its
burdens. Since no citizen enjoys immunity from that burden, its
retroactive imposition does not necessarily infringe due process
321

Thus, Justice Blackmun ignored the fact that in this case the retroactive
amendment had consequences beyond tax liability. The retroactive
amendment did "penalize" Carlton for furthering the public policy of
increasing employee ownership. 3 2 Notwithstanding that, the Supreme
315. Id. at 2023 (emphasis added).
316. Id.
317. Id. This statement ignores the difference between relying on the plain meaning
of a statute and relying to one's detrimenton the plain meaning of a statute. If the estate
had suffered no loss from the sale of the shares to the ESOP, but merely was required
to pay the tax deficiency, then one might say that the Supreme Court's analysis was not
suspect. However, here, the Court's analysis was suspect because it omitted a material

fact, i.e., that Carlton, acting as a fiduciary and thus, trying to benefit the estate by
decreasing its tax liability, sustained a loss of $631,000 in order to obtain a tax deduction

of $5million. See id. at 2021.
318. See id. at 2026 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that the Court overlooked the

fact of this loss).
319. Id. at 2023.
320.
321.
322.
Ct. 2018

Id.
Id. (citing Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 146-47 (1938)).
Carlton v. United States, 972 F.2d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S.
(1994).
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Court held that the Day estate was not entitled under the 1987 amendment
to the tax deduction. 3" At the very least, the Day estate should still
have been able to recover the money it lost as a result of complying with
the plain meaning of the original statute. 24
The government also argued that selling the shares at a loss was not
a condition precedent to qualifying for the deduction," z and thus, it
should not have been a factor in determining "whether retroactive
application of the decedent ownership requirement [was] unduly harsh and
oppressive." 3" In theory, the government was correct. However, the
Ninth Circuit pointed out that in practice, the seller (here, Carlton) had to
provide the purchaser (ESOP) with an incentive, in the form of a discount,
to purchase the shares from him rather than on the open market.3 z In
order to qualify for the deduction, the seller needed the cooperation of the
ESOP, which had to file certification that it had met certain
requirements. 3" The ESOP thus had added bargaining power and it
could and would demand some part of the tax break in the form of a
discounted share price, otherwise it would not have helped the estate to
comply with § 2057.329 Moreover, the government itself conceded that
Carlton would not have sold the shares at a discount, and thus, the ESOP
would not have been able to acquire shares at a discount, if not for the §
2057 deduction.33
Overall, the Ninth Circuit held that Carlton reasonably relied on the
plain language of § 2057 where Carlton had no actual or constructive
notice33 ' that the statute would be amended in such a way that would
323. Carlton, 114 S. Ct. at 2024.
324. See Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1061.

325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. See 26 U.S.C. § 2057 (repealed 1989).
329. Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1061.

330. Id. at 1054.
331. Id. at 1062. In Welch, the taxpayer challenged legislation that retroactively
imposed a tax on certain previously excluded income. See id. at 1058. There was no
evidence that the taxpayer changed his conduct in reliance on the law as it stood before
retroactive amendment. Id. In upholding the statute, the Court refused to assume that
an individual would reject corporate dividends even if he or she knew that his or her
receipt would later be subjected to a new or an increased tax. Id. "The Court stated,
however, that a different case would be presented where a transaction was taxed that was

'completely vested before the enactment of the taxing statute,' and 'the nature or amount
of the tax could not reasonably have been anticipated by the taxpayer at the time of the
particular voluntary act which the statute later made the taxable event.'" Id.
The
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contravene the public policy of benefitting ESOPs. 332 Also, Carlton's
did not return the estate
reliance was detrimental because the amendment
3
to the status quo (the estate lost $631,000).
The government also contended that the transaction was a sham, that
is, that it had no substance. 3 4 It argued that Carlton had purchased the
shares only two days before he sold them to the ESOP, and he intended
the tax benefit to outweigh the loss. 3 5 In rejecting the government's
argument, Judge O'Scannlain wrote:
We disagree. The substance was in the transfer of wealth from
the Day estate to the MCI ESOP. The Day estate was $631,000
poorer after the transaction than it was before. The MCI ESOP
now owns more shares than it would have had it only been able
to purchase shares on the open market. The permanently changed
Ninth Circuit literally applied the dicta in Welch. First, the Court of Appeals placed
great weight on the fact that Carlton's transaction with the ESOP was "completely
vested" before Congress amended § 2057. Second, the Court of Appeals stated that its
conclusion most likely would have been different if before Carlton had completed the
transaction he had notice that § 2057 would be amended. See id. at 1062. Indeed, the
Ninth Circuit would have decided Carlton differently if the decedent ownership
requirement had been introducedbefore Carlton made the sale to the ESOP, or if Carlton
had completed the transaction before any statement regarding a decedent ownership
requirement was officially published. Id. The Court explained, "[tihe government has
a strong interest in capturing within its taxing powers transactions deliberately rushed
through in anticipation of a pending change of law." Id. Compare infra text
accompanying note 336.
332. See Cartlon, 972 F.2d at 1058.
333. Id. at 1061.
334. Id.
335. Justice O'Connor, who concurred in the Court's judgment, also pointed out
that Carlton's purely tax-motivated sale of stock should not have met with disapproval
of the Justices: Carlton, as executor, properly structured the "estate's affairs to comply
with the tax laws while minimizing tax liability." United States v. Carlton, 114 S. Ct.
2018, 2024 (1994). In support of this point, Justice O'Connor quoted Judge Learned

Hand:
[A] transaction, otherwise within an exception of the tax law, does not lose its
immunity, because it is actuated by a desire to avoid, or, if one choose, to
evade, taxation. Any one may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as
low as possible; he is not bound to choose that pattern which will best pay the
Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one's taxes. Therefore,
if what was done here, was what was intended by [the statute], it is of no
consequence that it was all an elaborate scheme to get rid of [estate] taxes, as
it certainly was.
Id. (quoting Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934) (citations omitted),

aff'd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935)).
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position3 of
the parties show that the transaction had substance and
6
reality.1
Thus, the Ninth Circuit rejected the government's argument that
Carlton's transaction was a sham. Had the Ninth Circuit accepted this
argument, that would have been tantamount to protecting all of the
government's relevant interests at the expense of all of the Day estate's
relevant interests. The government sought (1) to promote employee
ownership by offering a tax deduction to estates who made "qualified
sales" to ESOPs337 and (2) then, once the estate made such a sale and
took a deduction, the government avoided revenue loss by denying the
deduction.338 Under this scheme the government attained its objectives
while not only removing the deduction ex post facto, but also by leaving
the estate in a worse position than it would have been in had the
government never offered the deduction. 39 Here, both the government
and the ESOP benefitted from the "bait and switch taxation,"' 0 whereas
the estate suffered a loss of more than a half million dollars."
V. CONCLUSION

There are two major historical criticisms of retroactive legislation."
One is that retroactive legislation fails to provide individuals, before they
act, with notice of the laws with which they must comply. Another
historical criticism is that retroactive lawmaking allows the legislature to
correct its "mistakes" and thus achieve its policy goals by statutorily
changing for the worse the position of individuals who had properly relied
on the original, unambiguous language of a statute. Thus, retroactivity
not only places tremendous power in the hands of the legislature, but also
limits the rights of individuals. Because the United States Supreme Court
failed to consider notice and reliance as factors of paramount importance,
it upheld against a due process challenge the retroactive tax statute in
question in United States v. Carlton. The Court sanctioned, now and in
336. Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1061-62.
337. Id. at 1053.
338. Id. at 1059-62.
339. Id.
340. See id. at 1061 (noting that the ESOP is able to buy shares at a discounted
price and that "the estate essentially 'paid' . . . to receive the $2.5 million reduction in
tax liability"); see also Carlton, 114 S. Ct. at 2026 (Scalia, J., concurring) (explaining

"bait and switch taxation").
341. Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1060.
342. See suprapart II (discussing the various criticisms of ex post facto lawmaking).
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the future, making the taxpayer pay for Congress's mistakes and thereby
satisfied the asserted intentions of the "governor" at the expense of the
governed.
Laura Ricciardi

